We study the effect of televised broadcasts of floor debates on the rhetoric and behavior of U.S. Congress Members. First, we show in a differences-in-differences analysis that the introduction of C-SPAN broadcasts in 1979 increased the use of emotional appeals in the House relative to the Senate, where televised floor debates were not introduced until later. Second, we use exogenous variation in C-SPAN channel positioning as an instrument for C-SPAN viewership by Congressional district and show that House Members from districts with exogenously higher C-SPAN viewership are more emotive in floor debates. Contra accountability models of transparency, C-SPAN has no effect on measures of legislative effort on behalf of constituents, and if anything it reduces a politician’s constituency orientation. We find that local news coverage – that is, mediated rather than direct transparency – has the opposite effect of C-SPAN, increasing legislative effort but with no effect on emotional rhetoric. Looking to electoral pressures as a mechanism, we find the emotionality effect of C-SPAN is strongest in competitive districts. Finally, C-SPAN exposure increases the vote share for incumbent Congress Members, and more so among those who speak more emotionally. These results highlight the importance of audience and mediation in the political impacts of higher transparency.

The urban rural divide in voting for anti immigration parties is one of the most striking patterns in contemporary Western democracies. Why are cities different? In large cities, segregation reduces the probability of contact between immigrants and natives and, hence, it reduces the salience of the immigration issue in the decision of how to cast a ballot. I show that citizens of large cities in France are more likely to vote more for far-right parties in response to immigration when segregation is low. The effect fades away as segregation increases. When the electoral response to immigration is analysed at the polling station level, i.e. when segregation is naturally controlled for, then standard results in the literature appear; more immigration is associated with more far-right vote, and more so if immigrants compete with natives for welfare.

Can international confrontation create incentives for regime change? If so, under what conditions? And in which direction? I propose a formal model of regime transition where the leader’s incentives to regime change depend on threats of international conflict and domestic audience costs. In the first period, the leader decides on whether to change regime. In the second, he or she decides how to act in the international conflict. In the third, the selectorate decides on whether or not to re-select the leader. For each opponent regime type, I obtain probabilities of regime transition that depend on exogenous institutional settings and endogenous probabilities of aggression. I find that threat of conflict always generates a positive probability of further power centralization. However, when an autocratic regime faces a democracy, there is also a window of opportunity for political liberalization. Across cases, institutional reforms are used to insulate the leader from possible domestic audience costs, or as a commitment to a conflict strategy.